Enforcement of the Statutes Governing Disposal and Cleanup of Hazardous Wastes by Dinkins, Carol E.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 1
Issue 1 1983 Article 3
January 1983
Enforcement of the Statutes Governing Disposal
and Cleanup of Hazardous Wastes
Carol E. Dinkins
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carol E. Dinkins, Enforcement of the Statutes Governing Disposal and Cleanup of Hazardous Wastes, 1
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1983)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss1/3
Enforcement of the Statutes Governing
Disposal and Cleanup of Hazardous Wastes
CAROL E. DINKINS*
It is an occasionally overlooked fact that, absent clear
statutory directives to the contrary, the Attorney General has
full plenary authority over all litigation in which the United
States is a party. This authority is not only firmly established
in common law and tradition but was specifically conferred by
one of Congress's first enactments-the Judiciary Act of
1789.1
Assigning this authority to the Attorney General central-
izes the conduct of litigation on behalf of the United States
and thereby furthers a number of important policy goals.
Centralized control assures, for example, that the United
States brings to the courts only those cases which are appro-
priate for judicial resolution. Moreover, such control over
litigation allows the presentation of uniform, consistent posi-
tions on important legal issues and ensures that the United
States will be able to select test cases which present the
government's position in the best possible light. It provides
for greater objectivity in the filing and handling of cases by
attorneys who are not themselves affected litigants. And,
finally, it facilitates presidential supervision over Executive
Branch policies implicated in litigation.
Implicit in the broad grant of litigative authority to the
Attorney General is the recognition that the Attorney Gen-
eral must serve the interest of the "client" agency as well as
* Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, United
States Department of Justice. B.S., University of Texas; J.D., University of Houston.
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announcing the establishment of the Pace University School of Law Center for
Environmental Legal Studies.
1. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 517 (1976).
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the broader interests of the United States. While the Attor-
ney General is obligated to enforce the Constitution and the
will of Congress as expressed in the public laws, he must also
be a strong advocate for the specific legal interests of the
client agency.
Fulfilling this obligation is a job that is taken very
seriously by the Land and Natural Resources Division. Our
client agencies, and the officials who run them, are charged
with the formulation and implementation of programs and
policy. In representing our client agencies, which include the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Departments of
the Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce and the Army Corps
of Engineers, our task is to defend their policies against legal
challenges and to enforce the law against those who violate it.
In performing this responsibility, we have a particular obliga-
tion to assure that our positions are well-founded in the law,
that they are fair, that our contentions and our strategy will
not embarrass or compromise the United States before the
federal courts, and above all, that we will promote justice.
One of the Division's very highest priorities involves
programs that are critical to protecting the public health and
the environment. These programs, which are primarily those
of the EPA, include enforcement of the statutes governing the
disposal and cleanup of hazardous wastes. The problems
which have arisen from the haphazard disposal of chemical
wastes might not have occurred had America remained a
simpler society. But the vast progress we have experienced in
this century, in the development of man-made products which
have enhanced our standard of living far beyond the expecta-
tion of our grandparents, has also become a serious threat to
values which Americans have always cherished: clean water,
clean air, and a safe environment.
In response to the inadequately controlled practices in-
volved in the storage, handling, and disposal of hazardous
substances, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976 and amended it in 1980.2 RCRA
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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established an ambitious "cradle-to-grave" regulatory ap-
proach to hazardous wastes, making it possible to track the
existence and ultimate disposal of toxic wastes. The statute's
primary thrust is to establish good management practices
which will ensure that the public health, welfare, and the
environment are protected from the careless handling and
disposal of these chemicals.
Despite its comprehensive nature, RCRA does not ade-
quately address the problems associated with abandoned
dump sites, or past practices, which have left a legacy of
threatened and actual danger to human health and the envi-
ronment. Recognizing the dangers presented by these sites, as
well as the dangers implicit in future releases of hazardous
substances, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980. 3
This statute, commonly known as Superfund, creates a $1.6
billion Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund which is to
be used to pay for abatement of releases or threatened re-
leases of hazardous substances which endanger the public
health, welfare, or the environment.
Although RCRA's primary thrust is prospective regula-
tion of existing sites, and Superfund authorizes the expendi-
ture of funds for cleanup of actual and potential environmen-
tal problems, both statutes rely on strong enforcement
provisions to encourage voluntary compliance and to insure
that noncompliance is dealt with swiftly and effectively. Sec-
tions 7003 of RCRA 4 and 106(a) of Superfund5 are "imminent
hazard" provisions which authorize the government to bring
suit in federal district court to seek and obtain such relief as
"is necessary" to abate an actual or potential endangerment
to health, welfare, or the environment. Section 107 of Super-
fund allows the government to recoup all money expended in
site cleanup from any responsible party, including litigation
costs.
6
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
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These broad grants of authority represent Congress's
clear intention that not only harm, but the risk of harm, will
be actionable, and that to the fullest extent possible the cost of
cleanup should be borne by those who were responsible for or
contributed to the problem. Although the Superfund and
RCRA enforcement efforts have not been in place very long,
we have already achieved some significant litigation victories
that will have important precedential effect not only on
future cases but on the prospect for settlement as well.
For example, in United States v. Hardage,7 the district
court held that section 7003 of RCRA confers strict liability
without fault upon any person contributing to the handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of a solid or
hazardous waste where such an activity may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment. And, in United States v. Price,8 the term "con-
tributing to" an imminent and substantial endangerment in
the context of section 7003 of RCRA was held to embrace
former owners and operators of property on which a hazard-
ous dump site was operated.9 The same court further recog-
nized that past activity was clearly within the purview of
section 7003.10 The Price court also rejected the current land-
owners' contention that they had no liability because they
were innocent purchasers of property on which the dump site
was located and no dumping had occurred after their pur-
chase of the property." The court focused on the present
landowners' responsibility arising out of their knowledge of
the past use of the site and existence of the dump site on the
property when they purchased it.12 This concept has also been
held to be applicable to responsible corporate officers who
contributed to the creation of an imminent hazard.13
7. No. 80 Civ. 1031-W (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 1982).
8. 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D. N.J. 1981).
9. Id. at 1072-73.
10. Id. at 1071.
11. Id. at 1073-74.
12. Id. at 1073.
13. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Chem. Co., Civ. No. 8-5066-
CV-SW (W.D. Mo. July 11, 1981).
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Price was appealed to the Third Circuit on other grounds
and, in a recent decision,14 the court made clear that injunc-
tive relief which requires monetary payments, such as fund-
ing a diagnostic study, may well be an appropriate form of
preliminary remedy.15 The court also observed that the emer-
gency abatement provisions of RCRA and Superfund actually
strengthen the power of the courts to order equitable reme-
dies. With respect to RCRA, the court emphasized that there
was "no doubt" that section 7003 "authorizes the cleanup of a
site, even a dormant one, if that action is necessary to abate a
present threat to the public health or the environment."1 6 The
court went on to state that "if a threat to human health can be
averted only by providing individuals with an alternate wa-
ter supply, that remedy, in an appropriate case, may be
granted under the authority of section 7003."'17 This portion of
the Third Circuit's opinion in Price, although technically
dicta, significantly undercuts the precedential value of the
now famous decision in United States v. Wade, 8 which was
handed down just a week earlier. In Wade, the district court
held, among other things, that "section 7003 may not... be
used to confer liability on non-negligent past off-site genera-
tors of hazardous waste."19 In our view, the court's holding was
founded on a narrow and highly selective reading of the
relevant legislative history. And for this reason we are ap-
pealing the holding in Wade.
With respect to the emergency abatement provision of
Superfund, the court in United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemi-
cal Corp.20 ruled that "Congress intended that those responsi-
ble for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons
bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful
conditions they created."21 Consequently, Superfund "should
14. 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
15. Id. at 211-13.
16. Id. at 214.
17. Id.
18. 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
19. Id. at 790.
20. 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
21. Id. at 1112.
19831
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not be narrowly interpreted to frustrate the government's
ability to respond promptly and effectively, or to limit the
liability of those responsible for clean-up costs." 22
The victories and opinions in Price, Hardage, Reilly Tar,
Northeastern Pharmaceutical, and several other cases, have
given litigators in the Division's Environmental Enforcement
Section what Mark Twain once called "the calm, cool confi-
dence of a Christian with four aces."2 These cases, which
represent only a fraction of our litigation effort in this area,
exemplify this Administration's commitment to law enforce-
ment. In our view, failure to comply with obligations es-
tablished by environmental statutes should be treated as
serious law enforcement matters deserving of the same atten-
tion and prosecution as violations of the tax, securities, anti-
trust or other laws.
The President, in announcing the Administration's Anti-
Crime Initiative, made the point that we often draw distinc-
tions between violent crime and sophisticated crime, or be-
tween crimes like drug-pushing and crimes like bribery. But
the truth is that crimes do not come in categories-they are
part of a pattern. If one sector prospers in the community of
crime, so ultimately do the others.
Implicit in the President's remarks is the awareness that
non-enforcement of some laws breeds disrespect for all laws.
This is equally true for civil as well as criminal enforcement
because only through active prosecution of violators can vol-
untary compliance with the law be encouraged. And I do not
believe it is naive to expect that solid support for an even-
handed and consistent enforcement effort should come from
industry itself. After all, failure to enforce Superfund, RCRA,
and the other environmental statutes confers a distinct com-
petitive advantage on the violator and, in effect, punishes the
law-abiding members of the business community.
Working from the well-founded premise that an active
enforcement effort encourages voluntary compliance with the
law, we have consistently maintained a willingness to negoti-
22. Id.
23. J. Bartlett (ed.), Familiar Quotations 680 (13th ed. 1955) (attributed).
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ate settlements that serve the public interest. In fact, we only
file suit after giving prospective defendants an opportunity to
meet with us face-to-face and to discuss the terms for a
voluntary resolution of their liability. While we favor negoti-
ated settlements, we cannot conclude that a negotiated settle-
ment of disputes is a "more viable alternative" to litigation.
That is because settlement and litigation work in tandem. To
encourage settlement and discourage those who refuse to
negotiate with the government, it is our policy in multiparty
hazardous waste cases to proceed to sue nonsettling parties
for all remaining relief to demonstrate a disincentive to those
who refuse to agree to a negotiated resolution of our claims.
Three recent hazardous waste cases-United States v.
Wade;24 United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Dis-
posal, Inc.;25 and United States v. Chem-Dyne28-- demonstrate
the seriousness with which we undertake this approach. In
United States v. Wade, we obtained $1.7 million from thirty-
one settling generators of hazardous waste and then amended
our pending suit to add claims for injunctive relief under both
RCRA and Superfund against the nonsettling generators. 27 In
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
we agreed to cash payments from companies for their share of
surface cleanup and gave them a release which reserved the
government's right to proceed against them, and any other
responsible party, for groundwater and other contamination
at the site. We then sought leave to amend our existing
complaint to add nonsettling parties to the suit.28 In United
States v. Chem-Dyne, EPA notified more than 280 private
companies that they were potentially responsible for cleanup
of the hazardous waste site in Hamilton, Ohio. We then
identified twenty-nine companies who contributed more than
eighty percent of the material at the site and focused negotia-
24. 546 F. Supp. 785.
25. Civ. No. 80-1274-6 (D. S.C. July 7, 1980).
26. Civ. No. C-1-82-840 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 1982).
27. 546 F. Supp. at 787.
28. Amended Complaint, United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,
Inc., Civ. No. 80-1274-6 (D. S.C. July 23, 1982).
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tions on these companies. After a period of intense negotia-
tions, we accepted settlement offers totaling approximately
$2.42 million from companies who contributed seventy per-
cent of the volume of wastes at the site. Settling parties were
released only as to surface liability and as to the performance
of a groundwater study. We reserved our rights with respect
to future litigation concerning groundwater contamination.
Immediately upon execution of an agreement with more than
one hundred parties, the United States filed a lawsuit against
the major nonsettling parties.29
Parties should understand that in allowing companies to
settle by "cashing out," as in Chem-Dyne, the government
must assume the risk of assuring that enough money exists to
effect cleanup and, therefore, more than a simple "fair share"
payment will be expected in settlement. This is a sensible
approach since costs will almost certainly increase after a
party cashes out. Moreover, at most sites not all responsible
parties will be solvent: thus, a purely volumetrically based
fractional settlement may never be completely possible.
We will generally negotiate and accept settlements which
take these uncertainties into account, protect the Fund, and
assure that cleanup will occur. In evaluating settlement of-
fers, credit is not given for past cleanup activity at a site; only
future expenditures and undertakings will form the basis of
the relief sought by the government. While laudable, past
voluntary activity simply cannot form the basis for settle-
ment of future liabilities. The reason for this is quite simple:
to the extent that a credit diminishes liability, Superfund
would have to make up the difference and this could exhaust
the funds needed to clean up sites where solvent financial
parties are unavailable.
In cases which the government has settled, we have
provided an adequate release from liability. We have taken a
flexible approach, including joint and several liability and
cashing out. But it should not be forgotten that our willing-
ness to negotiate is matched by a willingness to let the court
29. Civ. No. C-1-82-840.
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decide who is liable and for how much. I think it is fair to say
that parties involved with hazardous waste lawsuits now
respect the government as a firm, fair negotiator and litiga-
tor; we are not considered a paper tiger.
The Justice Department and the EPA have placed in-
creased emphasis on criminal prosecutions. EPA is staffing its
field offices with trained criminal investigators. The FBI has
agreed to investigate up to thirty hazardous waste cases per
year, and we have created a criminal unit within the Environ-
mental Enforcement Section of experienced criminal prosecu-
tors to work with the EPA and the United States Attorneys in
the development and prosecution of our cases. This approach
has been very successful. During the last year, in each case in
which an individual has been convicted of violating an envi-
ronmental statute, courts have imposed jail sentences of up to
two years.
I believe it is accurate to say that the criminal enforce-
ment program within the Lands Division is now mature and
experienced. We know how to try complex cases and get
convictions and we know how to sustain those convictions on
appeal. Of course, these convictions are not really won in
court by lawyers, they are won by the investigators who
collect evidence-evidence identifying the chemicals dumped
at hazardous waste sites and individuals who dumped them;
evidence of contamination of groundwater; and evidence con-
cerning the involvement of organized crime.
While a high degree of specialized technical expertise is
necessary for these investigations, I believe fundamental
investigative techniques and sound investigative instincts
are equally important. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
has committed the resources necessary to conduct, over the
next year, thirty full-scale investigations into illegal hazard-
ous waste disposal. In addition, EPA has recently hired
twenty-one experienced criminal investigators to staff its five
newly created area offices in Atlanta, Chicago, Denver, Phila-
delphia, and Seattle. Procedures have been implemented na-
tionally for the investigation and referral of criminal cases
from EPA to Justice. The result is that the caseload of crimi-
1983]
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nal actions is expected to double from the already increased
caseload that presently exists.
Let there be no misunderstanding: for those who endan-
ger the public's health by poisoning our land and water, it is
not going to be business as usual any longer. In cooperation
with state and local law enforcement agencies, the full force of
federal enforcement will be brought to bear on these illegal
acts.
I want to emphasize that the Department's policy in
criminal cases is to explore thoroughly the liability of individ-
uals rather than merely accepting pleas and fines from corpo-
rations. The Department of Justice does not view violation of
pollution laws as simply the acts of business organizations. It
is self-evident that the work of corporations is carried out by
individuals. Any employee, officer, or corporate director who
violates these laws is potentially a target of a criminal inves-
tigation. Moreover, attempting to remain ignorant of criminal
activity does not provide an individual with a defense. Under
RCRA, evidence that a party affirmatively attempted to avoid
knowledge of illegal activity is circumstantial evidence of the
necessary knowledge to support conviction under the stat-
ute.3 0
RCRA carries felony sanctions for "knowing" violations
which can result in jail sentences of up to two years and fines
up to $50,000.31 In addition, the "knowing endangerment"
provision of RCRA subjects individual defendants to fines of
up to $250,000 and five years in prison.3 2 A corporation that is
convicted of violating this provision faces a $1 million fine.33
The notification and recordkeeping provisions of both RCRA
and Superfund also provide criminal penalties.34
Let me close my remarks by telling you that I have only
scratched the surface of the existing and potential legal and
policy issues in the enforcement of RCRA and Superfund. I
30. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f) (Supp. V 1981).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (Supp. V 1981).
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (e); 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b),(d).
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believe that as the EPA's program of site cleanup progresses,
and additional litigation is generated, we will be taxed to the
limit of our abilities to be innovative and creative in resolving
these issues. But our determination to enforce the law to the
best of our ability will not falter.
11
